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1. Introduction
Seven years after the beginning of the fi nancial crisis, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in Europe is still at a lower level than in 2008 and unemployment has increased by 50% in 
the EU28. Following the recommendations of the European institutions, member states have 
been implementing consolidation policies since 2011, mainly by reducing public spending 
and increasing taxes. The cost of the crisis in terms of unemployment and poverty is huge 
and it shows that austerity policies are a failure in numerous dimensions. Two main - and 
26
Rémi Bazillier, Giovanni Cozzi, 
Amandine Crespy, Ferdi De Ville, Angela Wigger
contradictory - reasons have been invoked to explain such low economic and social perform-
ances. The fi rst strand argues that European economic policies were inappropriate and have 
contributed to the crisis itself. By trying to reduce public defi cits, governments have directly 
contributed to the depression, by lowering aggregate demand. Fiscal austerity explains the 
gap between economic performances in the EU and the US, where fi scal consolidation has 
been much lighter, leading to the faster recovery of the US economy.
On the contrary, the second strand argues that countries are paying for their incapacity to 
reform themselves. The offi cial narrative is that better economic performances (of Germany 
for instance) have shown that it is possible to reach fi scal discipline, competitiveness and 
growth, thanks to ‘successful structural reforms’ in the years since 2000. Based on this sup-
posed success, countries are pushed to make additional ‘reforms’.
It is symptomatic to see that most European offi cials are supporting the second narrative, 
while most academics in Economics are defending the fi rst option. Despite the strong criti-
cism of infl uential economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman and Thomas Piketty, 
the European institutions have continued to adopt and promote austerity-driven policies and 
a vast range of ‘structural reforms’.1 In fact, it appears that the narrow and one-sided concep-
tion of such reforms is mainly driven by short-term objectives in terms of defi cit reduction 
- and thereby implementing old policy recipes - rather than by an innovative reformist agenda 
and long-term commitment to genuine structural reforms.2
This obsession with ‘structural reforms’ is not surprising. Economic crises have often been 
seen by neoliberals as an ‘opportunity’ to move on, following their political and economic 
agenda. In a context of tight public fi nance, it is easier to push for additional cuts and reforms 
of social protection. If the pressure is put on European countries today, especially Southern Eu-
ropean countries, structural reforms have been on the agenda of numerous developing countries 
for years, with the structural adjustment plans of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. Following their disastrous social consequences, especially in terms of educa-
tion, health and poverty, the discourse within international fi nancial institutions has evolved, 
taking into account the need to prioritise poverty eradication. The effi ciency of this strategy can 
be discussed, but it is nevertheless paradoxical that the Troika3 did not take into account the 
social consequences of their programs. In fact, it seems that neoliberals have used the fi nancial 
crisis as a window of opportunity to pursue their long-standing agenda. This has been facilitated 
by the absence of a strong alternative, progressive policy agenda.
1 The European institutions do not provide a precise defi nition of ‘structural reforms’. The concept mostly derives 
its meaning from the type of reforms that are introduced in practice. For all intents and purposes in the EU 
policy context, structural reforms to labour and product markets are understood as reforms that ‘[…] help to 
improve economic growth prospects and the ability of economies to adjust to shocks by expanding fl exibility 
and improving the effi ciency of how and where productive factors are used.’ (Canton et al., 2014, p. 1)
2 In a recent op-ed, Dani Rodrik (2015) argues that structural reforms will be completely ineffi cient for recovering 
growth.
3 The decision group led by the European Commission with the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, that organised loan programmes to the governments of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus.
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The purpose of this volume is to show that there is not one single package of structural 
reforms. In the context of the current economic meltdown, alternative economic and social 
policies do exist. A better mix between demand and supply-side policies is needed and in-
vestments in the right areas are more than necessary. Our goal is to show that there are pro-
gressive ways to reform societies and that structural reforms are not necessarily neoliberal 
policies aiming exclusively at deregulating markets. There is a need to tackle the challenge of 
growing inequalities and to promote investment in youth, social infrastructure and productiv-
ity gains in the real economy. Progressives need to re-appropriate themselves the concept of 
structural reforms and propose an alternative defi nition of their content. Social investment 
and policies aiming at reducing inequalities are key pillars of such reappraisal. 
***
This volume engages a critical debate with a particular conception of social investment 
as put forward by the EU institutions, which has clearly hindered its potential as a truly pro-
gressive social policy agenda. In the current context of lingering unemployment, involuntary 
part-time work, precarious work and declining real wages across Europe, we see a danger of 
social investment to be hijacked by non-progressive political forces and policy-makers.
EU member states’ governments have responded to the current crisis by adopting a set 
of regulatory and treaty-based measures to ensure fi scal discipline through austerity, limit-
ing the capacities to run budget defi cits and to maintain social welfare provisions. Primacy 
is given to restoring investor confi dence and a competitive business climate. Social invest-
ment has become one of the many policy strategies to enhance the competitiveness of Euro-
pean economies. Competitiveness unequivocally refers to the ability to compete and thereby 
evokes a social imaginary of being part of a successful and ‘winning’ community. Although 
this might sound politically appealing and motivating particularly against the backdrop of 
a rising popular fatigue with further fi scal austerity and the concomitant rhetoric of an overall 
belt tightening, the suggested social investment to spur competitiveness is in many ways es-
sentially premised on internal devaluation through the labour markets, depreciating real wag-
es and introducing new labour market reforms. German Chancellor Merkel (2013) has been 
rather straightforward in this respect when arguing that it is vital to keep driving down labour 
costs in order to create a regulatory environment in Europe that is attractive to investors. To 
recover economic competitiveness, EU institutions and Eurozone governments have sought 
to precipitate the ongoing trend of making the labour market more fl exible (‘fl exibilisation’) 
by deregulating labour laws in the form of easing employee dismissals, reducing minimum 
wages, increasing working time for less remuneration, introducing additional conditionali-
ties and time limits for unemployment benefi ts, and decentralisation of collective bargaining 
more generally. The hollowing out of the concept of fl exicurity is also telling in this respect: 
it ended up being about fl exibility without much security for workers.
At the same time, social welfare state provisions and social rights are being dismantled 
and increasingly disembodied from the state. The far-reaching cuts in services of general in-
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terest such as education, child, health or elderly care, social housing and other social services 
preclude a serious engagement with the much-needed social investment. In the discourse of 
EU institutions, and the European Commission in particular, the idea of social investment has 
been reduced to participation in the labour market. One central tenet of social investment is 
precisely to replace cash transfers or benefi ts – which only compensate for social inequalities 
ex post – with services which enable individuals to fully participate in a society’s activities 
– and thus aims to avoid inequalities ex ante. It is striking, for example, when reading the 
Country Specifi c Recommendations (CSR) made by the Commission and the Council in the 
European Semester, that recommendations related to the welfare state put the emphasis on 
those services which are directly connected to improving people’s employability – such as 
childcare (for women), vocational education, and services for job seekers. Everything else 
seems to be regarded as non-growth-oriented and hence, not immediately relevant.
A worrying confi guration emerging from the European multi-level constellation is a du-
alisation (the creation of a population of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ who are not covered by 
society’s safety nets) resulting from a fl awed conception and implementation of social in-
vestment. Increasingly, public resources are targeted at specifi c categories of the population 
such as the young, the long-term unemployed and the elderly in the framework of policy 
programmes which often lack long-term fi nancial security. In a context of declining real 
wages and ongoing labour market fl exibilisation, close to ten percent of the EU population 
is affected by in-work poverty, or what better can be termed the ‘working poor’, and nearly 
a quarter of the EU population is facing the risk of poverty or fi nancial and social exclusion 
(Eurostat, 2013a and 2013b). With the privatisation of public goods, services previously 
free of charge now have to be purchased with private money, with the result that access to 
debt has become essential to ensure the material conditions of existence and to cover basic 
needs. In fact, the share of citizens who resort to debt out of necessity, rather than out of 
convenience or a hedonistic lifestyle, has been on the rise. The wide availability of fi nancial 
products such as complex forms of consumer credit (credit cards, store cards and high street 
bank loans, current account overdrafts, as well as the growth of more fl exible and diverse 
forms of mortgage fi nance) has become central to the reproduction of labour. The prevail-
ing understanding of social investment is geared towards profi tability, and subordinated to 
competitiveness rather than social cohesion. As a consequence, the perspective of equal 
opportunities within society as a whole is, again, replaced by a discrimination between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.
The broader understanding of social investment which should guide progressive deci-
sion-makers has a set of implications. First, a comprehensive social investment policy should 
override notions of competitiveness. Social investment should become the primary rationale 
for the European integration trajectory. It should not reduce people’s full participation in 
society simply to inclusion in the labour market. Participation in the labour market is not 
suffi cient to tackle inequalities as many inequalities are built into the labour market. The cur-
rent approach only exacerbates structural imbalances and economic disintegration in Europe. 
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Second, rather than seeing the purpose of social investment in terms of strengthening peo-
ples’ capabilities alongside the conservative-neoliberal understanding of competitiveness, 
the aim should be to address the coverage of basic needs to allow social inclusion more 
broadly. Thirdly, social equality is productive per se: More cohesive and egalitarian societies 
are more prone to economic and social welfare. Above all, social cohesion is desirable from 
a political, value-based point of view. Finally, social investment should be part of a global 
modernising agenda, which does not lead to the fragmentation of welfare states in a way that 
prevents the coherence and consistency of social policy. 
***
This book develops alternative visions and policies from a progressive perspective. 
The fi rst chapter of this book by Claassens, Saenen and Schneider summarises the Eu-
ropean Commission’s current vision of structural reforms, and follows this with criticism 
focused on the impact of its vision on equality of opportunity, equality of outcome, and 
horizontal equality. They also highlight the huge social cost of the current crisis, based on the 
fi ndings of the SOLIDAR Social Progress Watch. Finally, they present 15 SOLIDAR propos-
als, showing that there are alternatives to the current concept of structural reforms. 
The following part of the book highlights specifi c complementary aspects and is organ-
ised in three parts. The fi rst part focuses on the identifi cation and targeting of inequalities, 
drawing specifi c proposals to address different types of inequalities. The second part focuses 
on a social investment strategy and policies, highlighting the need to get our proper vision 
of social investment. Lastly, the third part deals with specifi c policies affecting social safe-
guards, such as trade policy, labour market policy and poverty reduction policies. 
2. Part I - Identifying and Targeting Inequalities
Part one of this book presents some compelling evidence on the need to reconsider the 
role of social and economic policies for promoting equitable and sustainable economic re-
covery. Indeed, it is now well documented how the economic crisis and austerity policies in 
Europe have undermined progress towards equality, not only in terms of income, but also in 
terms of pay and conditions, as well as employment opportunities for women, and access to 
jobs for young Europeans. 
However, despite the increased recognition of the negative impact of the economic crisis 
and recession on equity, policy responses, both at European and national levels, have so 
far broadly neglected this dimension of the crisis and have predominantly focused on fi scal 
containment and public debt reduction. Indeed, at the onset of the crisis it was believed that 
a policy approach focusing on fi scal containment and government debt control would bring 
about higher economic growth and higher levels of employment.
Seven years after the onset of the crisis it is now evident that this policy approach has 
failed. Economic growth is still too low in many countries, unemployment remains very 
high and inequalities have further increased. This is most evident in Southern Europe, where 
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a country like Italy has experienced a decrease of more than 5 percentage points in GDP be-
tween 2008 and 2014. But also in Germany, which is doing much better economically than 
other European countries, output growth averaged at little more than 1% per annum over the 
same period (Griffi th-Jones & Cozzi, forthcoming March 2016).
Further, the preoccupation with fi scal defi cits and government debt has also had repercus-
sions on equity. For instance, austerity policies had negative impacts on public sector employ-
ment and welfare provision, and this has particularly hit women as public sector jobs tend to be 
female-dominated. Further, fi scal austerity has also led to recruitment freezes or job cuts which 
have then resulted in increased working intensity (longer hours, fewer holidays, and less family-
friendly shift patterns) for those remaining in employment. Women have been disproportionately 
affected by such changes, thus undermining the progress made towards gender equality (Cozzi 
& De Henau, 2015).
To reverse these worrying trends powerful action is needed. There is a growing consen-
sus that Europe should move away from an exclusive focus on fi scal consolidation and put 
forward policies which would bring it to a more sustainable and equitable development tra-
jectory. To this end, the European Commission has put forward new policies such as the 315 
billion Euro ‘Investment Plan for Europe’. The objective of this plan is to increase invest-
ment across Europe in infrastructure, research and development, and education, among other 
areas, in order to increase economic growth and create jobs for men and women of all ages.
Although this plan represents a good point of departure from the usual exclusive focus on 
fi scal containment and public debt reduction, the plan’s almost exclusive focus on physical in-
frastructure spending and investment will further undermine progress towards equality, in terms 
of pay and conditions as well as employment opportunities for women and young people. 
Instead, a long-term recovery that would not only be more equitable but also more sustain-
able should focus its efforts on achieving a caring economy, where care for people as well as for 
the environment is the central objective. This means that any progressive policies for Europe 
should not only focus on investing in physical, and in particular green, infrastructure but also on 
social infrastructure. The contributions in part one of this book address some of these concerns 
and present some of the fundamental social policies that the European institutions should con-
sider to bring equity and sustainability to the core of the economic recovery.
The chapter by De Rosa shows that in order to improve progress towards a more social 
Europe and to put social cohesion back at the heart of EU policies, it is necessary to pay 
more attention to the gender dimension of the economic crisis and counter-crisis measures, 
going beyond the formal recognition of the principle of gender equality. Antonucci, in her 
chapter, discusses the limits of the social investment strategy pursued in EU social policy. In 
particular Antonucci deals with the increased challenges faced by young graduates in transi-
tion to the labour market. She proposes the institution of a universal transition fund, fi nanced 
by contributions of all workers (insiders included), employers and the state. The purpose of 
such a fund would be both to intervene in the crucial phase of the fi rst job search and to offer 
protection during the increasingly frequent spells of unemployment in between jobs. Finally, 
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the contribution by Gabor et al., using Hungary as a case study, focuses on the need of insti-
tuting an economically and politically viable basic income scheme. In particular they argue 
that a bold new European system of basic income might help the EU to get closer to a truly 
social Europe, ‘a Europe of the citizens for the citizens’.
3. Part II - Shaping Social Investment
The three contributions gathered in the second part of this book bring insights at various 
levels of the debate. The contribution by Sacha Dierckx puts the emphasis on the ideas and 
values which should be underlying policy-making. On the topical issue of investment, we 
have good reasons to believe that relying simply on the private sector, which seems to be the 
philosophy underlying the recent ‘Juncker Plan’, is illusory, especially because the private 
sector has a narrow conception of utility which focuses on profi t making in the short-term 
rather than social utility in the longer term. Instead, Dierckx advocates for a ‘socialisation’ 
of investment, which can be activated at three levels: through public investment, through the 
stimulation of public development banking, and through the promotion of cooperatives and 
the social economy. All this should go hand-in-hand with a democratisation of investment-
fostering participation in decisions. 
Taking a closer look at the social investment agenda in the realm of social and care serv-
ices, Andrea Ciarani sheds light on the pitfalls of its implementation. While this sector can 
be an important reservoir of growth and jobs, the focus has mainly been put on job quantity 
at the expense of job quality in a context where productivity gains are diffi cult to achieve. In 
this regard, Ciarani calls for two courses of action. On the one hand, specifi c policy tools and 
budget lines must be identifi ed that can feed investment into social care infrastructure in the 
long run. In this regard, it is clear that the current pressure of fi scal discipline leaves most EU 
member states with a lack of appropriate fi nancial means. Thus, there should be a strategy 
coordinated at EU level for identifying possible sources of funding. On the other hand, edu-
cation and training policies must be developed in order to enhance the level of qualifi cation, 
hence the quality of jobs in the social services sector. 
At the micro level of analysis, Menno Soentken offers a thorough study on activation and 
work disability in the Netherlands. The Dutch case describes how policy effi ciency can be 
fostered by appropriate institutional arrangements. More specifi cally, Soentken shows that, 
in the Netherlands, a reform of sickness and disability funds aimed to make employers more 
responsible by coupling their contribution more tightly with their ability to include sick or 
disabled people in the workplace. This reform has led to a signifi cant decrease in the caseload 
of disability benefi ts. This study shows that, besides fi nancial investment, the social invest-
ment agenda also involves a crucial institutional dimension. Measures related to the govern-
ance of individual policy sectors can be taken which create incentives for all actors, starting 
with employers, to adopt a behaviour which is in tune with social investment.
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4. Part III – European Policies Affecting Social Safeguards
This volume advocates a clear, progressive rethinking of the European Union’s structural 
reforms and social investment agenda. The contributions in Part III argue that this can only 
succeed when it is being supported by reforms in policy domains that indirectly affect social 
conditions in the Union. Only a holistic reorientation of EU socio-economic policies can 
lead to a real alternative approach that stimulates jobs, growth and social investment while 
safeguarding social protection at the same time. 
It has been recognised for a long time that the monetary policy regime of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is biased towards low infl ation policies and exchange rate apprecia-
tion and against growth and full employment. The result is that welfare states are put under 
fi nancial strain, and that lowering labour costs has become the ultimate adjustment variable 
for European economies. The euro crisis and the involvement of the ECB in the troika have 
only made this role of the ECB more visible. In an (in)famous interview with the Wall Street 
Journal in 2012, the ECB President Mario Draghi even declared the European Social Model 
‘gone’. But also the EU’s external economic relations contribute to the structural privileging 
of conservative and reactionary social policies. All too often, the dismantlement of social 
protection is legitimated by references to (global) competitiveness pressures. This discourse 
can again be exemplifi ed by a favourite line of Chancellor Merkel: “Europe accounts for 7% 
of the world’s population, 25% of its economy, and 50% of global social welfare spending”, 
the implication being that this is unsustainable and the EU should ‘reform’ its social model. 
A trade policy that is directed only at further liberalisation without ambitious and enforce-
able social and environmental conditions implies that the EU itself reinforces the competitive 
pressure on European welfare states. The contributors in this part therefore all call for differ-
ent approaches to such socio-economic policies that affect social safeguards.
In their contribution, Ranft and Thillaye analyse one of the clearest examples of how 
a potentially progressive concept (‘fl exicurity’) has been hijacked and instrumentalised by 
conservative forces in the EU. Instead of empowering workers and giving them more choice 
to achieve their desired work-life balance, it has in practice been a coercive weapon to de-
crease job protection. When at the same time European labour markets are becoming ever 
more polarised and dualised, this conservative application of the fl exicurity concept makes 
both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ more insecure. Ranft and Thillaye discuss how progressives 
can reclaim the fl exicurity concept, and how this can be put into practice. 
Del Priore goes beyond a critique of the ECB’s role in the euro crisis and puts forward 
an alternative monetary policy strategy that would support the fi ght against unemployment. 
Building on proposals for ‘helicopter money’ and ‘quantitative easing for the people’ that 
have recently received wide support amongst economists, the author argues that the top prior-
ity of the fi scal-monetary policy-mix in the Eurozone should be to restore full employment 
and that, consequently, the ECB should fi nancially ‘guarantee’ a genuine Job Guarantee pro-
gramme. 
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Basso examines the effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
under negotiation since the summer of 2013, on employment and labour rights. Rather than 
being an instrument at the service of social protection, he demonstrates that TTIP risks putting 
further competitive pressure on the European social model, especially if the ‘sustainable 
development’ chapter(s) on labour and environmental rights remain as vague and weakly 
enforceable as in past EU trade agreements.
Taken together, this book shows from a number of different points of view that the aus-
terity policies favoured by governments since the economic crisis are not helping Europe’s 
citizens and therefore, a clear, progressive rethinking of the concept of structural reforms and 
the social investment agenda is urgently needed.
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